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LITIGATING INTRAOPERATIVE NEUROMONITORING
(TOM)
Michael Brook and Kary Irle, JD, CNIM
INTRODUCTION
Statistics regarding surgical medical malpractice are staggering.
The annual cost of the medical malpractice liability system has been
estimated to be $55.6 billion-2.4% of the total healthcare system.'
The median award for plaintiffs in actions involving spinal cords is
$2.9 million, and the median value for settlements is $1.45 million.2
A neurosurgeon will spend approximately eleven years of his or her
career with outstanding malpractice claims.
Intraoperative neuromonitoring (IOM), also known as surgical
neurophysiology, is hardly a novel medical technology.' In fact, it
has been used in the operating room for over half a century.5 IOM
provides real-time monitoring of a patient's nervous system during
surgeries that involve the brain, spinal cord, or peripheral nervous
system.6 This allows the surgeon to determine what, if any, actions
need to be taken to reduce the risk of permanent neurological injuries
to the patient after the surgery.7
As such, exploring IOM is incredibly useful to those who litigate
medical malpractice cases involving patients who are paralyzed or
suffer a loss of sensation. As seen by the rise in medical malpractice
cases involving IOM in the past decade, attorneys are finally
1. Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH
AFFS. 1569, 1569 (2010), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/9/1569.full.pdf+h
tml.
2. See Robert S. Quigley et al., Reason for Lawsuit in Spinal Cord Injury Affects Final
Outcome, 40 SPINE 851, 851 (2015), http://joumals.lww.com/spinejoumal/Abstract/20
15/06010/Reason forLawsuitin_SpinalCordInjury_.Affects.22.aspx.
3. Kimon Bekelis et al., The Practice of Cranial Neurosurgery and the Malpractice
Liability Environment in the United States, PLOS ONE 1, 11 (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4370383/pdf/pone.0121191.pdf.
4. See AAGE R. MOLLER, INTRAOPERATWVE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING 3 (2d ed.
2006). Wilder Penfield, the founder of intraoperative neurophysiological research,
used electrical stimulation to find epileptic foci in the 1950s. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 1-2.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id.
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becoming versed in how IOM is utilized in the operating room and
are formulating arguments regarding its use.' IOM has been used by
both plaintiffs' attorneys to advance their theories of negligence, as
well as by defendants' attorneys to exculpate their parties from
liability.9 Though courts have yet to promulgate any IOM specific
case law, several important principles emerge from the limited
available cases involving neuromonitoring. This paper examines
recent litigation involving IOM to analyze how attorneys and courts
alike could approach the intricate issues that may arise from IOM
use. Due to the lack of concrete guidance for determining how a new
technology impacts the medical malpractice system, this paper
reviews litigation involving comparable technologies and suggests an
approach for evaluating liability resulting from the adaptation of new
medical technology.
Part I will provide a basic overview of IOM and the legal
implications that follow. Part II will explore the use of IOM in the
courtroom and how the use of IOM can be a double-edged sword,
supporting both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. Part II will also
discuss whether the failure to use IOM during surgery can be used to
fulfill a plaintiffs first requirement in a medical malpractice
lawsuit-establishing the requisite standard of care. Finally, Part III
will discuss how courts approach medical technologies, such as X-
rays, electronic fetal monitors (EFMs), and carbon dioxide monitors,
in an attempt to make parallels to IOM and predict how courts will
examine issues involving IOM when carving out the future of
medical malpractice law.
I. THE BASICS OF INTRAOPERATIVE NEUROMONITORING
This portion of the paper provides the reader with a basic
understanding of IOM and briefly discusses where legal liability may
arise during the process. A list of the different types of IOM
modalities is provided in Appendix I.
A. What is Intraoperative Neuromonitoring?
At its most basic, IOM is a method used to monitor a patient's
nervous system by stimulating the nerves and recording the
responses. 10 It is used to identify structures of the nervous system,
such as nerve roots or nerve tracts, or to detect functional changes
8. See infra Part II.
9. See cases cited infra Part II.
10. MOLLER, supra note 4, at 1.
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that are caused by surgery."l The goal of IOM is to identify at what
time and anatomical location an injury occurs during surgery. 12
Hopefully, the results gathered from the IOM will provide the
surgeon with sufficient information to take corrective measures to
prevent or minimize permanent postoperative injuries.13 According
to the American Society of Neurophysiological Monitoring, IOM's
purpose is the "protection of the patient's nervous system.' 14
Neuromonitoring is performed utilizing a team approach of
monitoring personnel and physicians. 5  A technologist places
stimulating and recording electrodes on the patient, performs
troubleshooting techniques if needed, and conducts the monitoring
during the surgery. 16 A qualified healthcare professional interprets
the data, but the technologist will communicate any changes to the
interpreting provider, the surgeon, and the anesthesiologist.' 7
B. Anatomy and Physiology
To understand how 1OM works, it is necessary to understand basic
physiology. The sensory pathway that allows a person to feel pain or
light touch begins with stimulation of nerve receptors in the
extremities.'8 The stimulation travels as an electrical impulse along
the nerve and travels through the spine.' 9 From there, it travels
through the brainstem and is ultimately relayed to the somatosensory
cortex of the brain.20 The motor pathway for voluntary muscle
movement travels in the opposite direction. 21 The impulse begins in
11. AM. CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY SOC'Y, GUIDELINE 1lA: RECOMMENDED
STANDARDS FOR NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC INTRAOPERATIVE MONITORING - PRINCIPLES
(2009), http://www.acns.org/pdf/guidelines/Guideline-11A.pdf [hereinafter ACNS
GUIDELINE 1 A].
12. MOLLER, supra note 4, at 1.
13. Id.
14. AM. SoC'Y OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING, http://www.asnm.org (last visited
Mar. 31, 2016).
15. Stanley A. Skinner et al., Practice Guidelines for the Supervising Professional:
Intraoperative Neurophysiological Monitoring, 28 J. CLINICAL MONITORING &
COMPUTING 103, 105-11 (2014),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3948520/pdf/10877_2013Article_94
96.pdf.
16. Id. at 104-05.
17. Id.
18. STEPHEN GOLDBERG, CLINICAL NEUROANATOMY MADE RIDICULOUSLY SIMPLE 17
(34th prtg. 2014).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 19-20.
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the motor area of the cerebral cortex and travels down through the
brainstem and through the spinal cord.22 From there, nerves exit the
spine and travel to the muscles.23
Thus, IOM works by stimulating the somatosensory or motor
pathway and recording the impulse as it travels through various
neural structures.24 By identifying at what point along the pathway a
reduction or loss of signal occurs, the surgeon can identify what
neural structure is at risk and can possibly take corrective action to
prevent permanent injury by stretching or compressing neural tissue,
or prevent ischemia by clamping an artery. 5 Inadvertent injuries can
range from slight, transient injuries with rapid return of function to
permanent damage to nerve tissue that never recovers function.26
While IOM can directly measure the responses to stimulation of the
nerves, it can also be an indirect measure of the blood supply to the
brain.27 Each region of the body-face, arm, leg, foot-corresponds
to a section of the sensory and motor cortices in the brain.28 If blood
flow is restricted or obstructed in a particular artery in the brain, then
the corresponding region of the body will show a decrease or loss of
responses in the monitoring. 29 For example, if retraction of an artery
impedes the flow of blood to the area corresponding to the legs and
feet, there will be a loss of sensation and strength in the legs and feet
that IOM can detect. 30
To achieve the goals of identifying anatomical structures at risk and
to monitor the functionality of those structures, several types, or
modalities, of evoked potential tests are employed, and the failure to
use the proper modality could form the basis for liability.31
C. Legal Liability Considerations of Intraoperative Neuromonitoring
How should IOM be incorporated in medical malpractice actions?
First, one could ask whether a surgeon's failure to use IOM
constitutes malpractice. After all, IOM is widely available and
22. Id.
23. See id. at 19-21.
24. MOLLER, supra note 4, at 10.
25. Id. at 9-10.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Id. at9.
28. GOLDBERG, supra note 18, at 7.
29. Id.
30. See MOLLER, supra note 4, at 9.
31. Id.; see also discussion infra Appendix 1 (discussing the types of neuromonitoring
modalities).
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commonly used.32 The use of IOM may also support a surgeon's
defense that all actions and precautions that could be used were
actually employed, or be used to shift legal liability from the surgeon
to the IOM technologist.33
Direct liability of the IOM technologist (and the employer) could
arise from events that could result in death or permanent loss of
function.3 4  There could be a false negative result in which a
compromise to the nervous system occurred but was not revealed by
the testing, and the patient develops a postoperative deficit as a
result.35 A delay in reporting a significant change to the surgeon, a
delay in checking equipment, or some other possible technical
difficulties could reduce the surgeon's chances to correct an injurious
action and increase the risk of a permanent postoperative
neurological injury.3 6  The wrong patient or body part may be
monitored, or a monitoring electrode could be left in a patient and
require additional medical or surgical intervention.37
II. INTRAOPERATIVE NEUROMONITORING IN THE
COURTROOM
IOM is a double-edged sword for both plaintiffs' lawyers and the
defense. On one hand, IOM has been used to support a plaintiff's
theory of negligence such as the failure to use IOM,38 failure to heed
results,39 and negligent monitoring.40 In cases involving IOM,
32. See David P. Magit et al., Questionnaire Study of Neuromonitoring Availability and
Usage for Spine Surgery, 20 J. SPINAL DISORDERS & TECHS. 282, 282, 287 (2007)
("Almost 70% [of surgeons] preferred some neuromonitoring for anterior
thoracic/thoracolumbar cases and 55% for posterior thoracic/thoracolumbar cases.").
33. See Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122, at *15-19
(N.H. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2006).
34. See McKnight v. Catholic Hosp., S-1500-CV-269628-SPC, 2013 Jury Verdicts
LEXIS 13867 (Cal. Super. Dec. 2, 2013).
35. MICHAEL IMHOF, MALPRACTICE IN SURGERY: SAFETY CULTURE AND QUALITY
MANAGEMENT IN THE HOSPITAL 44 (2013).
36. MOLLER, supra note 4, at 283-84.
37. Arvydas A. Tamkus et al., Quality Assurance and Performance Improvement in
Intraoperative Neurophysiologic Monitoring Programs, 53 NEURODIAGNOSTIC J. 46,
49 (2013).
38. See Nissen v. Johnson, No. CIV. 09-4166-KES, 2011 WL 4832561 (D.S.D. Oct. 12,
2011); Kingsley v. Pinto, No. 27-CV-09-286, 2009 WL 6763770 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2009); Vaccaro v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 898 N.Y.S.2d 163 (App. Div.
2010).
39. See Lico v. Schwartz, No. 09-9457, 2011 WL 4021308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 23, 2011);
Thomas v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, No. 90550, 2008 WL 5191340 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 2008).
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plaintiffs' attorneys have successfully achieved jury awards as high
as $26,802,019.41 On the other hand, IOM has also been used
"defensively"-allowing parties to exculpate themselves by shifting
liability from a surgeon or hospital to the technologist or his or her
employer.42 Defense verdicts are common in cases in which plaintiffs
developed quadriplegia following spinal surgery.43 As the use of
IOM increases, so does the risk of lawsuits for health care providers
and facilities." Therefore, medical malpractice attorneys should
become well-versed in how the technology can be used in the
courtroom. Though courts have yet to promulgate any IOM specific
case law, in the limited cases involving IOM, several important
principles emerge.
A. Intraoperative Neuromonitoring as a Legal Standard of Care
Generally, to establish a cause of action for medical malpractice,
the patient must show that: (i) the physician owed the patient a
particular standard of care; (ii) the physician deviated from the
applicable standard of care owed to the patient; (iii) there was a
40. See Coleman v. North Fulton Neurology, 05-EV-000092J, 2007 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
46931 (Ga. State Ct. Mar. 23, 2007).
41. McKnight v. Catholic Hosp., S-1500-CV-269628-SPC, 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
13867 (Cal. Super. Dec. 02, 2013). In McKnight, the plaintiffs, after settling with the
neurosurgeon and the hospital, successfully argued that the neuromonitoring
technicians were negligent by failing to notify the surgeon of a significant loss in
signal during surgery. Id. The jury award became the largest medical malpractice
award in the history of Kern County, California and the plaintiffs' attorneys were
nominated for Consumer Attorneys of the Year for "improving safety for
neurosurgery patients." Doyle, Stevens, Blanco, Michels and Lew, 2014 Consumer
Attorney of the Year Finalists, YouTUBE (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UumnpcMRWTc; CONSUMER ATT'Ys OF CAL., CAOC ANNOUNCES
2014 AWARD FINALISTS, (2014), http://www.scottglovsky.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/1 1/CAOC-Award-finalists-presser-8-13-2014.pdf. The award
was ultimately reduced to $20,003,701.12. McKnight, 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
13867.
42. See Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122 (N.H. Super.
Sept. 22, 2006).
43. In a 2010 study of 54 medical malpractice suits of patients who developed
quadriplegia following spinal surgery there were: "19 plaintiffs' awards (average US
$5.9 million, range US $540,000-$18.4 million), 20 settlements (average US $2.8
million, range US $66,500-$12.0 million), and 15 defense verdicts ($0.00)." Nancy
Epstein, The Need to Add Motor Evoked Potential Monitoring to Somatosensory and
Electromyographic Monitoring in Cervical Spine Surgery, 4 SURGICAL NEUROLOGY
INT'L (SUPP.) S383, S387 (2013), http://sni.wpengine.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/3904/SNI-4-383.pdf.
44. Yafa Minazad et al., Legal Issues, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC
INTRAOPERATIVE MONITORING 368 (Aatif M. Husain ed., 2d ed. 2015).
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causal connection between the act or omission that resulted in injury
to the patient; and (iv) because of the act or omission injury has been
incurred.45 When bringing a malpractice suit, the plaintiff must first
introduce evidence, generally through expert testimony, to establish a
medical standard of care.46 After the plaintiff has established the
applicable standard of care, the fact finder can then determine
whether the physician's conduct deviated from that standard to the
degree of constituting malpractice.47 Thus, establishing a standard of
care is essential for establishing a prima facie case of medical
malpractice.48
In Kingsley v. Pinto,49 the surgeon performed a complete fusion of
the patient's T3-S 150 vertebrae, which led to the plaintiff's paralysis
of her lower extremities." Kingsley alleged that Dr. Pinto was
negligent by failing to use 1OM during the surgery despite IOM being
readily available at the hospital. 2 Kingsley contended that, had 1OM
been used, Dr. Pinto would have learned of the injury to the spinal
cord immediately and would have been able to treat the injury to
avoid permanent paralysis.53 The defendant relied on a causation-
based argument, alleging that the plaintiffs experts could not
"identify the alleged injury that Kingsley suffered during surgery that
would have been identifiable and correctable through intraoperative
neuromonitoring. ' '1 4 The court, ruling on the defendant's motion to
dismiss, concluded that "the most likely cause of her injury was a
vascular compromise to her spinal cord, and if the proper standard of
45. See, e.g., Hill v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 325 (D.C. 2007)
(citations omitted); Decker v. Rochowiak, 791 N.W.2d 507, 518 (Mich. Ct. App.
2010) (citations omitted); McAllister v. Franklin Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 910 So. 2d
1205, 1209 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted); Bell v. Mayview State Hosp.,
853 A.2d 1058, 1061 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Decker, 791 N.W.2d at 518; Stanton v. Westbrook, 598 S.W.2d 331, 333
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see also STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE § 8:1 (3d ed. 2015).
47. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Reeves, 730 S.W.2d 19,21 (Tex. App. 1987).
48. See Pannu v. Jacobson, 909 A.2d 178, 192 (D.C. 2006) (citations omitted).
49. Kingsley v. Pinto, No. 27-CV-09-286, 2009 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 24 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
2009).
50. "Cl-C7 represents the cervical vertebrae in the upper spinal column, TI -T12 represent
the thoracic vertebrae in the mid-back, Ll-L5 represent the lumbar vertebrae in the
lower back, and S1-S5 represent the sacral vertebrae." Id. at *2 n. 1.
51. Id. at *2-3.
52. Id. at *3-4.
53. Id. at *3-5.
54. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 11, Kingsley, 2009
Minn. Dist. LEXIS 24, at *8.
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care were followed and IONM utilized, the injury would likely have
been discovered and her paralysis would have been reduced or
avoided."55
The court in Kingsley contemplated 1OM as a legal standard of
care, and implicitly stated that the proper standard of care in spinal
surgeries included JOM.56 However, the jury nonetheless awarded a
defense verdict in that case.57 Additionally, another case touched
upon the standard of care topic; at issue in Nissan v. Johnson was
whether failure to use IOM during an operation on the plaintiffs
cervical spine gave rise to a claim for punitive damage. 8 The
plaintiff alleged that the use of IOM would have detected that a sharp
object had penetrated the plaintiff's spinal cord. 9 Although the court
determined that the plaintiffs allegations did not give rise to a claim
for punitive damages, as no actual malice was shown, the court
alluded to the fact that the use of IOM could constitute a standard of
care in this type of procedure.60 Finally, in reversing a motion to
dismiss the 1OM technologist and his employer from a medical
malpractice lawsuit, the court in Vaccaro v. St. Vincent's Medical
Center stated that negligent monitoring could suggest a deviation
from the accepted standard of care. 6'
Should IOM constitute a legal standard of care? In its simplest
form, the standard of care is the care most people would exercise
under the same or similar circumstances.62 In medical malpractice
cases, "physicians must exercise at least the skill, knowledge, and
care normally possessed and exercised by other members of their
profession" to meet the relevant standard of care.63  Some
jurisdictions apply the locality rule, which states that liability may be
measured using local and regional standards, as opposed to
55. Kingsley, 2009 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 24, at *11-12.
56. Id. at *13.
57. Kingsley v. Pinto, 27-CV-09-286, 2010 WL 3216458, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2,
2010).
58. Nissen v. Johnson, No. CIV. 09-4166-KES, 2011 WL 4832561, at *4-5 (D.S.D. Oct.
12,2011).
59. Id. at *4.
60. See id. at *5 ("Assuming as true, as the court must at the summary judgment stage,
that Dr. Johnson hastily recommended surgery, chose the incorrect surgical procedure,
should have but failed to use intraoperative monitoring, and lacerated Brenda's spine
with a sharp object, a jury could find that these actions violated the standard of care
that Dr. Johnson should have used.") (emphasis added).
61. Vaccaro v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 898 N.Y.S.2d 163, 163-64 (App. Div. 2010).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
63. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS § 292, Westlaw (database updated June
2015).
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nationwide standards. 64 Other states do not refer to local guidelines
and instead look to a nationally recognized standard.65
First, in determining whether IOM should be a standard of care, it
is helpful to look at how IOM is interpreted in the legal community.
In addition to Kingsley, Nissen, and Vacarro, in which the court
either explicitly considered IOM as a legal standard of care or alluded
to it as constituting a standard of care, courts have accepted clinical
evoked potentials, such as nerve conduction studies, to determine the
degree of disability in Social Security benefit cases.66 The reliability
of IOM has not been undermined in the courts; instead, in Boisvert v.
Sluyters, the court stated that there was no evidence that undermined
the scientific reliability of IOM monitoring when the plaintiffs argued
that the technology was unreliable and not widely used at the time of
the surgery.67
Additionally, medical organizations and insurance providers have
examined IOM and its role in the operating room. The American
Academy of Neurology (AAN) has recognized IOM as a standard
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 3d 595, 607 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("The
physician is 'held to "the reasonable skill which a physician in good standing in the
community would use in a similar case .... (quoting Newell v. Corres, 466 N.E.2d
1085, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984))); Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., 18 N.E.3d 383, 387
(N.Y. 2014) ("In a malpractice case against, for example, a doctor or a lawyer, the
defendant is generally held to the level of skill and care used by others in the
community who practice the same profession."); Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772,
777 (Va. 2002) ("[T]he standard of care in a medical malpractice action [is] that
degree of skill and diligence exercised by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the
same field of practice or specialty in Virginia.").
65. See, e.g., Complete Family Care v. Sprinkle, 638 So. 2d 774, 777 (Ala. 1994)
("Doctors have legal duty to exercise degree of care, diligence, and skill that
reasonably competent physicians in national medical community would ordinarily
exercise when acting in same or similar circumstances."); Zeller v. Greater Bait. Med.
Ctr., 506 A.2d 646, 652 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (concluding that trial court
correctly stated that "a national standard of practice is the applicable standard to be
applied"); Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 800 A.2d 216, 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
("A physician has a duty to exercise in the treatment of his or her patient the degree of
care, knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised in similar situations by
the average member of the profession practicing in his or her field.").
66. See, e.g., Head v. Astrue, No. CV211-136, 2012 WL 1816191, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr.
23, 2012); Boryk v. Barnhart, No. 02 CV 2465 (JG), 2003 WL 22170596, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2003); Vasquez v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-7194 (JLC), 2015 WL
4399685, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2015); Mary Washington Hosp. v. Holloway,
No. 1582-98-2, 1999 WL 1126459, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999).
67. Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122, at *16-17 (N.H.
Super Sept. 22, 2006).
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practice for nearly thirty years.68  According to the AAN, "Both
neurophysiologic IOM and TEE/POE [transesophageal
echocardiography/perioperative echocardiography] are recognized
medical practice standards reliant on experience, case series and
retrospective analyses."69 So pervasive is the use of IOM that the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Coverage and private insurance
groups provide reimbursement for IOM in various surgical
procedures such as spinal instrumentation or decompression,
resections of tumors of the cranial nerves, and surgeries involving the
aortic arch.70 Even state medical boards have determined that failure
to use "necessary neuro-imaging studies" during spine surgery results
in a violation the medical standard of care because IOM could reveal
nerve damage. 7
However, utilization of IOM is not without controversy. The
American Academy of Neurology, American Association of
Neurological Surgeons, the Congress of Neurological Surgeons, and
the American Clinical Neurophysiology Society all acknowledge the
usefulness of IOM in spinal surgeries but stop short of proclaiming
IOM techniques as a standard of care.7 2  Moreover, although
insurance providers recognize that IOM may be medically necessary
in some surgical procedures, they do not provide coverage for all
surgical procedures.73
The cost of IOM could also impact whether its use is reasonable in
a particular procedure. Examining whether the benefits of IOM
outweigh the costs of conducting IOM sheds light on the standard of
care issue-whether IOM would normally be utilized by other
68. See AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, PRINCIPLES OF CODING FOR INTRAOPERATIVE
NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC MONITORING (IOM) AND TESTING 1 (2010), https://www.aan.com
/uploadedFiles/WebsiteLibraryAssets/Documents/3.PracticeManagement/1 .Reimb
ursement/1 .Billing-andCoding/5.Coverage..Policies/Coverage%20Policies%20-
%20IONM.pdf.
69. Id.
70. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LCD ID L35003, INTRAOPERATIVE
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL TESTING (2015); Intraoperative Neurophysiologic Monitoring,
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD ALA. (May 2015), https://www.bcbsal.org/providers/policies
/final/306.pdf; Evoked Potentials Studies, AETNA, http://www.aetna.com/cpb/medical/
data/100_199/0181.html (last updated Dec. 8, 2015).
71. See Doug J. Swanson, Piano 's Baylor Hospital Faces Hard Questions After Claims
Against Former Neurosurgeon, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014, 11:16 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/investigations/20140301 -planos-baylor-hospital-faces-
hard-questions-after-claims-against-former-neurosurgeon.ece.
72. Krystal Tomei et al., Intraoperative Spinal Neuromonitoring - Indications and
Patterns of Usage Among Neurosurgeons, 7 UH NEUROLOGICAL INST. J. 16, 19
(2014); ACNS GUIDELINE 1 IA, supra note 11.
73. See supra note 70.
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members of the medical profession. Controversy exists regarding the
cost-benefit analysis of using 10M, and several studies question
whether the benefits of 10M outweigh its cost.74
Finally, 10M may not be a reasonable practice in states that apply
the locality rule and measure negligence by taking into account a
"variety of resource conditions."75 Thus, one may need to consider
the availability, training, and experience of 10M personnel.76
B. Negligent Monitoring
When a patient suffers a neurological injury and 10M is performed
during surgery, the misuse of 10M can give rise to an inference of
negligence.77 Liability will depend on who failed to properly utilize
74. Compare Juanita Garces et al., Intraoperative Neurophysiological Monitoring for
Minimally Invasive 1- and 2-Level Transforaminal Lumbar Interbody Fusion: Does It
Improve Patient Outcome?, 14 OCHSNER J. 57, 57, 60 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nim.ni
h.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3963053/pdf/i1524-5012-14-1-57.pdf (finding that IOM did
not make a difference in the incidence of pedicle screw positioning errors in
transforaminal lumbar interbody fusions and provided no additional benefit when
compared to the increased cost of monitoring), and Caroline Helwick, Benefit of
Intraop Neuromonitoring May Not Outweigh Costs, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/803386 (comparing patients who underwent
cervical spinal surgeries with and without IOM and finding that the complications
between the two groups were similar and that IOM increased the cost of the procedure
by approximately $5,000), with John P. Ney et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Intraoperative Neurophysiological Monitoring in Spinal Surgeries, 30 JOURNAL OF
CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 280, 283 (2013) (finding that IOM provided
considerable lifetime cost-savings in excess of $2.3 million for 100 monitored
surgeries), and Mark M. Stecker, A Review of Intraoperative Monitoring for Spinal
Surgery, 3 SURGICAL NEUROLOGY INT'L (SuPP.) S174, S185 (2012),
http://sni.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/3541/SNI-3-174.pdf (finding
that, in high risk and complex surgeries IOM "is clearly critical to improving
outcomes"). See also infra Part III.B.3.
75. E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 1719, 1729 (1987).
76. See John P. Dormans, Establishing a Standard of Care for Neuromonitoring During
Spinal Deformity Surgery, 35 SPINE 2180, 2181 (2010). There are currently
approximately 24 programs offering formal education and training in the field.
CAAHEP Accredited Program Search, COMM'N ON ACCRED. ALLIED HEALTH EDUC.
PROGRAMS, http://www.caahep.org/Find-An-Accredited-Program/ (last visited Mar.
31,2016).
77. See Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122 (N.H. Super
Sept. 22, 2006); Lico v. Schwartz, No. 09-9457, 2011 WL 4021308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 23, 2011); Thomas v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, No. 90550, 2008 WL
5191340, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2008).
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the technology.7" The threshold question is whether the injury
resulted from the surgeon's failure to heed results rendered by the
technologist or from the technologist's failure to notify the surgeon of
any changes in signals.7"
This is the critical question because a technologist's role in the
operating room is limited; the technologist is not authorized to take a
surgical course of action once signals drop.80  Nor does the
technologist interpret the cause of any changes in the signals; a
qualified healthcare provider as defined by state law and the
American Medical Association interprets the data.8" After a decrease
in signals, the technologist troubleshoots and resolves any technical
problems such as checking electrode leads and their placement.82 The
anesthesiologist checks whether blood pressure is adequate and
verifies the levels of other gases.8 3 If there are no anesthetic or
technical problems, then the surgeon steps in and takes the
appropriate surgical cause of action. 4 If necessary, these measures
could include ordering a wake-up test.85
Thomas v. University Hospital of Cleveland86 illustrates the
potential for finding a surgeon liable due to the failure to conduct a
wake-up test after a reported decrease in signals. Fifteen-year-old
78. See Boisvert, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122; Lico, 2011 WL 4021308; Thomas, 2008
WL 5191340.
79. See Boisvert, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122; Lico, 2011 W 4021308; Thomas, 2008
WL 5191340.
80. See Lico, 2011 WL 4021308; see also Emily B. Kale & Christa B. Swisher,
Introduction to the Operating Room, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC INTRAOPERAT1VE MONITORING 24 (Aatif M. Husain ed., 2d ed.
2015).
81. Skinner et al., supra note 15, at 104-05.
82. Thomas N. Pajewski et al., Current Approach on Spinal Cord Monitoring: the Point
of View of the Neurologist, the Anesthesiologist and the Spine Surgeon, 16 EuR. SPINE
J. (SuPP. 2 S115, S126 (2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC207289
5/pdf586_2007_Article_419.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. During an intraoperative wake-up test, patients are awakened during or immediately
after the completion of spinal procedures and "are asked to squeeze the
anesthesiologist's hands and to move their feet before anesthesia is continued."
Oliver Grottke et al., Intraoperative Wake-Up Test and Postoperative Emergence in
Patients Undergoing Spinal Surgery: A Comparison of Intravenous and Inhaled
Anesthetic Techniques Using Short-Acting Anesthetics, 99 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA
1521, 1521 (2004), http://journals.lww.com/anesthesia-
analgesia/Fulltext/2004/1 1000/IntraoperativeWake-Up-Test andPostoperative.44.a
spx.
86. Thomas v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, No. 90550, 2008 WL 5191340 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 2008).
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Thomas underwent an elective surgery to correct his scoliosis. 87
During the surgery, the IOM technologist reported to Dr. Thompson,
that the neuromonitoring signals decreased.88 Despite the lowered
signals, the surgeon proceeded with the surgery and placed screws on
both sides of the spine.89 The signals continued to decrease, and
ultimately Thomas awoke unable to move his legs.9" Thomas was
rendered a paraplegic and died two years later.9
The plaintiff argued that Dr. Thompson deviated from the
acceptable standard of care in spinal procedures when the IOM
signals decline.92 The proper standard of care, according to the
plaintiff, was "to stop the procedure and perform a 'wake-up test."' 93
In particular, the plaintiffs expert came to the following conclusion
regarding the change in signal:
[A] change in the SSEP signals signifies that something is
wrong with the functioning of the spine and that a wake-up
test, in which the patient is awakened and asked to move his
toes, is standard practice in these types of cases. If the
patient can move his toes, the surgery can continue. If the
patient cannot move his toes, the surgery should be
terminated and corrective measures taken.94
Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that the failure to stop the
procedure decreased Thomas's chance of recovery. 95
Conversely, Dr. Thomas argued that the plaintiffs experts failed to
show proximate cause. 96 Dr. Thomas contended that, because the
plaintiff "could not state to a degree of medical certainty exactly what
caused the injury to [Thomas's] spinal cord, the estate could not
prove an essential element of its medical malpractice claim and he
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 97
The Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with the plaintiff and allowed
a claim for loss-of-chance of recovery even though the plaintiff did
87. Id. at*1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *3-4.
93. Id. at *3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *4.
96. Id. at *3.
97. Id.
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not plead this cause of action in the complaint.98 In reversing the
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the doctor, the
court of appeals concluded that "there remains a triable issue of fact
as to whether Dr. Thompson increased the risk of harm to [Thomas]
by delaying treatment that might have inured to his benefit and
thereby depriving him of the possibility of recovery." 99
In Thomas, the surgeon was the party responsible for the plaintiffs
injuries because the IOM technician alerted the surgeon to the
lowered signals, and the surgeon was the only party authorized to
take surgical measures (i.e., order a wake-up test).10 ° Likewise, in
Lico v. Schwartz, the technologist successfully moved to dismiss a
case in which the plaintiff experienced a left foot drop after spinal
surgery. 1 ' The technologist presented testimony that he (1) properly
set up the IOM equipment, (2) adequately performed IOM by
appropriately stimulating and recording responses, (3) informed the
surgeon of all of the changes during surgery, and (4) engaged in
troubleshooting, such as confirming patient positioning and electrode
positioning, to rule out a technical problem. 0 2 Once these measures
are taken by the technologist, only the surgeon has the authority to
"alter the surgical course."' 1 3 Thus, a technologist's actions could not
be the proximate cause of the patient's injury if the injury resulted
after the technologist employed proper monitoring and alerted the
surgeon of changes.
In some cases, however, actions by the technologist (and his or her
employer via vicarious liability) can give rise to an inference of
negligence. A technologist's failure to notify a surgeon of a loss in
signals could result in liability for the technologist and present the
opportunity for the surgeon to exculpate himself or herself.'°4 By
98. Id. at *5-6.
99. Id. Based on the March 15, 2011 Trial Order from the case it appears that the jury
entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a total of $306,000. Trial Order, Thomas
v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, No. CV04550328, 2011 WL 7986350 (Ohio. Com. P1.
Mar. 15, 2011).
100. Thomas, 2008 WL 5191340, at *4-5.
101. Lico v. Schwartz, No. 09-9457, 2011 WL 4021308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 23, 2011). A
left foot drop is "a weakening of the muscles that allow one to flex the ankle and toes,
causing the individual to drag the front of the foot while walking and to compensate
for this scuffle by bending the knee to lift the foot higher than usual." Grant Cooper,
What is Foot Drop?, SPINE-HEALTH, http://www.spine-health.com/conditions/leg-
pain/what-foot-drop (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
102. Lico, 2011 WL 4021308.
103. Id.
104. See McKnight v. Catholic Hosp., S-1500-CV-269628-SPC, 2013 Jury Verdicts
LEXIS 13867 (Cal. Super. Dec. 02, 2013) ("[H]ad [the surgeon] been notified of the
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failing to notify the surgeon, the IOM technologist inhibits the
surgeon's opportunity to mitigate or prevent the injury."0 5 Other than
liability stemming from a lack of communication, a plaintiff could
allege the technologist was negligent in his or her performance of
IOM. 106
An inference of negligence can also be asserted by a theory of
negligent oversight. 10 7 In some cases, the surgeon may supervise the
technologist and not delegate another party to oversee the
technologist, thus making the surgeon responsible for the
technologist's actions.108 In other cases, a neurologist may supervise
the technologist either in person or remotely.109 If the supervising
neurologist is unable to devote sufficient time to each case or is
limited in his or her ability to respond quickly, the plaintiff may have
grounds for an allegation of negligent oversight.110 Similarly, an
outsourced monitoring company could be liable for negligent hiring
or training, or failure to properly credential technologists. 1 '
Finally, an inference of negligence can arise when the wrong type
of IOM is ordered at the outset. The decision to utilize a particular
IOM modality, or a series of modalities, is made by consensus among
the anesthesiologist, the interpreting provider, the IOM technologist,
and the surgeon; thus the failure to utilize the proper modality or a
proper combination of modalities could subject the parties to
liability."2 For instance, studies recommend that during thoracic or
thoracoabdominal surgery, the surgical team should apply a group of
IOM modalities consisting of somatosensory evoked potentials
signal loss, he would have had six to eight hours to obtain a CT myelogram, discover
the bone fragment, remove it, and prevent paralysis.").
105. See id.
106. Minazad et al., supra note 44, at 375.
107. See id. at 374.
108. Id. at 372; R. O'BRIEN, AM. NEUROMONITORING Assocs., P.C. & IMPULSE
MONITORING, INC., INTRAOPERATIVE NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC MONITORING: MODERN
APPLICATION IN HOSPITALS, MEDICAL CENTERS AND INTEGRATED HEALTHCARE
SYSTEMS 24 (2008), http://www.impulsemonitoring.com/PDF/IONM%2OWhite%20P
apers/White%20Paperl/o2OIONM%20for/20lnstitutions%20finalV2.pdf.
109. See McKnight, 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 13867 (asserting cause of action against
supervisor of IOM technologist for failure to adequately train, for assigning an
inexperienced technician to a complex surgery, and for providing a blind diagnosis
over the phone when the IOM technologist called for advice during the surgery).
110. Minazad, supra note 44, at 374.
111. Id.
112. John Doe v. ABC Hosp., 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 12070 (Md. July 15, 2013);
Pajewski et al., supra note 82; see infra Appendix 1 (summarizing different types of
neuromonitoring modalities).
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(SSEP), motor evoked potentials (MEP), and electromyography
(EMG) monitoring.113 In a case of a toddler's paraplegia after a
spinal fusion, the parties settled for $4,750,000 when the plaintiffs
alleged, among other things, that the technicians utilized the wrong
equipment during surgery." 4
C. Exculpatory Power of IOM
Like many medical malpractice actions, cases involving IOM will
bring up numerous different parties and complex liability issues,
therefore providing the opportunity for defendants to shift liability
depending on what actually occurred in the operating room. 115 Not
only do plaintiffs seek to introduce evidence of 1OM to allege their
theories of negligence, but defendants have attempted to produce
10M evidence to exculpate their party from liability. 116
For instance, in Boisvert v. Sluyters, the anesthesiologist and his
employer introduced expert testimony alleging that 1OM, if done
correctly, would have detected the plaintiffs' injury.ll7 The plaintiffs
unsuccessfully moved to preclude this testimony because, as the
plaintiffs asserted, the use of intraoperative monitoring was
irrelevant, did not cause the injuries, and was not part of a standard of
care." '8 The court admitted the testimony of the defendant's 10M
expert because "there is some evidence that had the intraoperative
monitoring been properly performed, [the] plaintiff Kenneth Boisvert
may not have suffered any injury. '"" Subsequently, the case
proceeded to trial, and the defendants were found not negligent. 120
Thus, when an adverse event occurs and 10M is used,
113. Pajewski et al., supra note 82, at S124.
114. According to the settlement summary of a case filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, the plaintiffs alleged that the "technicians used a device designed to measure
sensory evoked potentials (SEPs), instead of MEPs. Plaintiffs alleged that this
improper equipment selection resulted in further inability to obtain strong MEPs and
proper observation of MEPs during the surgical course." ABC Hospital, 2013 Jury
Verdicts LEXIS 12070.
115. In Vaccaro v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, the defendants included: the hospital, the
neurosurgeon, the anesthesiologist, the physician's assistant, the neuromonitoring
technologist, and the healthcare company employing the neuromonitoring
technologist. 898 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165-66 (App. Div. 2010).
116. See Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2006 N.H. Super. LEXIS 122, at *17-18
(N.H. Super. Sept. 22, 2006).
117. Id. at*16-17.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *17.
120. Verdict, Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2004 WL 5258002 (N.H. Super. 2004).
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anesthesiologists named in a lawsuit could utilize IOM to exculpate
themselves from liability.
However, the anesthesiologist may not be able to absolve himself
or herself from liability simply by alleging that IOM could have
detected the injury, at least at the summary judgment stage. In
Vaccaro v. St. Vincent Medical Center, where the plaintiff suffered a
spinal cord contusion during surgery, the anesthesiologist moved for
summary judgment, stating that the administration of anesthesia fully
conformed to accepted medical practice and, therefore, the
anesthesiologist could not have caused the plaintiffs injury.'2' The
plaintiff, however, provided testimony that if the IOM machine was
not working and IOM could not be performed during surgery, both
the surgeon and the anesthesiologist had the obligation to cancel the
surgery.'22  Specifically, the plaintiffs expert stated that the
anesthesiologist deviated from the acceptable standard of care by not
"stop[ping] the surgeon from performing an elective procedure when
necessary monitoring equipment is not being used."'1 23  The court
concluded that the lack of intervention by the anesthesiologist was at
least sufficient to withstand the anesthesiologist's motion to dismiss
the case.124 In addition, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, denied the hospital's and IOM providers' motions for
summary judgment. 125 Regarding the hospital, the court determined
that the hospital failed to put forth sufficient evidence that it had a
properly working and readily available SSEP monitoring machine. 126
Regarding the IOM providers, the court concluded that, because there
was no testimony that the IOM was not negligently performed, the
providers did not establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law. 27
The ability to use IOM to exculpate a party from liability will
greatly depend on whether the parties involved are hospital
employees or whether they are independent providers. As previously
mentioned, the hospital may utilize in-house IOM services or
outsource IOM services. 128  Similarly, the surgeon, the
anesthesiologist, and other medical personnel can also be
121. Vaccaro v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr, 898 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (App. Div. 2010).
122. Id. at 167.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 165.
126. Id. at 166-67.
127. Id. at 168.
128. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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independent contractors of the hospital.'2 9  Determining IOM's
exculpatory power will require a highly fact specific inquiry of what
exactly occurred during the surgery and the relationship between the
parties involved. Without delving too deeply into the principles of
respondeat superior and vicarious liability, the considerations of
which are imperative in all medical malpractice actions, the following
hypothetical illustrates liability issues specific to IOM use.
A patient underwent a lumbar spinal fusion of the L5-S 1 vertebrae.
The technologist performed SSEP and spontaneous and stimulated
EMG of the appropriate muscles in the legs. When the surgeon
tested the position of the screws by stimulating them, the technologist
informed the surgeon that stimulation of the left L5 screw elicited no
compound muscle action, which indicated proper screw placement.
After all instrumentation was placed, the surgeon ordered a series of
X-rays, and all instrumentation appeared to be properly placed in the
spine. After the surgery was complete, the technologist noticed that
the recording electrode for the L5 nerve root in the leg muscle was
partially out of position, but he did not inform the surgeon of his
discovery. The patient awoke with left foot drop, indicating a
neurological injury to the L5 nerve root. The patient alleged that the
surgeon negligently performed the surgery and that the technologist
negligently performed the monitoring.
Although IOM was used, there were no changes in the monitoring
results, and the technologist reported that stimulation of the L5 nerve
root did not elicit any compound action potentials. Thus, there is the
potential for the technologist and the surgeon to be liable for the
patient's injury. The attorney would then inquire whether the
technologist used the appropriate monitoring modalities. In this case,
the technologist monitored EMG and SSEP as required by the
hospital's protocols.
However, it is also important to consider whether a technical
problem masked the injury. In this case, the technologist discovered
that a critical recording electrode was misplaced and failed to inform
the surgeon of the error. An expert would explore whether the
technologist followed the proper protocol in determining that the
initial placement was correct, whether the monitoring record
indicated a problem that the technologist should have seen and
investigated, and whether the displacement of the electrode was
sufficient to mask an injury to the L5 nerve root. The facts here are
insufficient to make these determinations, but the technologist's
liability seems likely, both for the technical problem and failure to
129. 1 PEGALIS, supra note 46, at § 6:20.
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communicate the error to the surgeon. An attorney could argue that,
had the technologist informed the surgeon about the electrode, the
surgeon could have taken additional action to ensure that the L5
nerve root was undamaged.
Then comes the question of the surgeon's liability. She used IOM
to monitor the integrity of the peripheral nerves and to test the
placement of the screws. Additionally, she confirmed the placement
of the instrumentation with X-rays. As far she knew, both the
monitoring and the X-rays indicated that the instrumentation was
properly placed. Assuming that she did not deviate from the standard
of care in her execution of the surgery, she had no reason to question
the validity of the monitoring and X-rays. Nor did she have any
knowledge of the misplaced electrode after the surgery. Thus, it
appears that the surgeon would not be liable for the injury in this
scenario.
However, that does not end the inquiry. The attorney then must
explore the liability under vicarious liability and respondeat superior.
The first inquiry is whether the hospital is liable for the patient's
injury. A hospital is only liable for the malpractice of physicians
who act in an employment or agency capacity, and has no
responsibility for overseeing surgeries by the plaintiffs private
physicians. 30 Unless the patient reasonably believed that the surgeon
was acting on behalf of the hospital, the hospital will not be liable for
the surgeon's acts of malpractice if the surgery is rendered by a
private attending physician. 3 ' A similar inquiry is required for the
IOM technologist. Was the technologist an employee of the hospital
under the supervision of another interpreting provider, such as a
neurologist or anesthesiologist, or was the technologist a contractor
with an independent IOM company? 32 Also, it is important to
130. See Lico v. Schwartz, No. 09-9457, 2011 WL 4021308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 23, 2011);
see also I PEGALIS, supra note 46, at § 6:20.
131. See Sarivola v. Brookdale Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 612 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (App. Div.
1994).
132. In some cases the neuromonitoring technologist is employed by a separate third party
company. See Vaccaro v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 898 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165-66 (App.
Div. 2010); Lico, 2011 WL 4021308; Boisvert v. Sluyters, No. 04-C-0421, 2006 N.H.
Super. LEXIS 122, at *1 (N.H. Super. Sept. 22, 2006). Many larger hospitals,
however, employ their own unit of IOM technicians. See, e.g., Intraoperative
Neurophysiology Monitoring Unit (IONM), MASS. GEN. Hosp.,
http://www.massgeneral.org/neurology/services/treatmentprograms.aspx?id= 1816http
://www.massgeneral.org/neurology/services/treatmentprograms.aspx?id= 1816 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2016); Intraoperative Neurophysiological Monitoring (IONM),
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determine who contracted with the company to perform the surgical
neurophysiology-the surgeon, the independent provider, or the
hospital-and investigate the level of control the surgeon or hospital
had over the technologist.133
In addition to shifting liability, defendants in medical malpractice
actions involving IOM have other avenues of eliminating liability.
While plaintiffs have received multimillion dollar awards and
settlements in cases involving IOM, defense verdicts are also
common. 134  Defendants have successfully argued, among other
things, that a patient's long history of spine disease and seriousness
of spinal compression created a very serious risk of paralysis,' that a
venous congestion was the cause of the patient's paralysis,'36 and that
neurologic complications were caused by severe preoperative spinal
stenosis.137
III. IMPACT OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ON LITIGATION
A. Medical Technologies and Legal Considerations
In the medical malpractice context, the standard of care and other
liability considerations are constantly evolving and subject to change
based on scientific advancements in the field of medicine.' While
medical technology provides considerable benefits to healthcare and
patient safety, the major reason for the relatively recent substantial
increase in medical malpractice cases is the tremendous surge in new
medical techniques and equipment.'39 However, case law has rarely
addressed, head on, how medical innovation influences legal
standards.141 Medical professionals are held to a reasonableness
standard, which analyzes what a reasonable person, with the same
background, training, and expertise as the defendant, would have
JOHNS HOPKINS MED., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/neurology-neurosurgery/cent
ersclinics/ionn/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
133. See Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Va. 1982); see also 1 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
134. See Epstein, supra note 43, at S387.
135. See, e.g., Collier v. Resurgens PC, 2011 WL 6093386 (Ga. Super. Apr. 15, 2011).
136. See Demedio v. Khurana, SC096635, 2011 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 202330 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 20, 2011).
137. See JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, JVR No. 1406030067, ESTATE OF COOLEY V. DIXON
M.D.; YOON M.D. (2015), 2013 WL 8561791.
138. Smethers v. Campion, 108 P.3d 946, 949-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
139. See Benjamin Levine, The Problem of Medical Malpractice in Today's Society, in 1
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1-4 (David W. Louisell & Harold Williams eds., 2002).
140. See Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an
Elusive Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 425-26 (2009).
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done in a similar situation. 4' Medical technologies can significantly
impact the reasonableness standard and present complex issues when
determining whether the non-use or misuse of a technology allegedly
resulted in injury to a patient. Examining how courts have reacted to
the introduction of medical technologies in the past can be useful in
predicting how courts will approach medical technologies, such as
IOM, in the future.
One of the earlier medical technologies that established a standard
of care is the use of X-rays.14 2  Since 1928, courts have held that
failure to use X-rays when required can establish a prima facie case
of negligence.143 If a plaintiff can show that a failure to X-ray in that
particular situation departed from acceptable medical practice, then
the plaintiff will establish that a standard of care was violated. 144
However, in some situations, where a patient's symptoms would not
cause a reasonably prudent physician to order X-rays, the physician's
conduct will not constitute a deviation from the standard of care. 145
Generally, the physician's liability involving X-rays stems from
failure to order, or failure to properly interpret, the X-ray images. 146
In addition to negligence based on the failure to diagnose or diagnose
properly, earlier cases noted that negligent operation of an X-ray
machine could result in liability for either or both the X-ray
operator 147 and the physician, 48 depending on the scope of the
parties' relationship. At least one court has imposed a dual standard
of care on physicians who utilize X-rays; the physician is responsible
141. Id. at428.
142. See Lippold v. Kidd, 269 P. 210, 213 (Or. 1928); see also Gonzales v. Peterson, 359
P. 2d 307, 310 (Wash. 1961).
143. See Lippold, 269 P. at 213.
144. See, e.g., Evans v. Holleran, 604 N.Y.S.2d 958, 960 (App. Div. 1993); Burford v.
Baker, 127 P.2d 941, 943 (Cal. App. Ct. App. 1942); see also Lockridge v. Oakwood
Hosp., 777 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that the failure to
order a chest X-ray of a pediatric patient who has collapsed after having difficulty
breathing constituted a breach of the standard of care, even though the patient's
injury, an aortic dissection, was unforeseeable in pediatric patients).
145. Angela R. Holder, Physician's Failure to X-ray, in 12 AM. JUR. 2d. Proof of Facts § 2
(1977).
146. See Antonio Pinto et al., Spectrum of Diagnostic Errors in Radiology, 2 WORLD J.
RADIOLOGY 377, 377 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2999012
/pdf/WJR-2-377.pdf; see also Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Iowa
1970) (holding that the negligent failure to diagnose properly in and of itself may
itself be malpractice).
147. See, e.g., Runyan v. Goodrum, 228 S.W. 397, 403-04 (Ark. 1921).
148. See, e.g., Gray v. McLaughlin, 179 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Ark. 1944); Gross v. Robinson,
218 S.W. 924, 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920).
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for the "mechanical operation of the apparatus" as well as the
diagnosis and treatment of the patient. 49 The emergence of X-ray
technology in the early 20th century greatly advanced patient care,
but also became the largest source of medical malpractice liability,
due to claims of excessive radiation and the failure to properly
interpret the films.150
While X-rays were the first medical technology to impact medical
malpractice law, their use in healthcare is distinguishable from
monitoring technologies such as IOM. X-rays are a diagnostic
technology and, therefore, a claim of negligence will most often
focus on the failure to diagnose.'15  On the other hand, monitoring
technologies such as IOM are used in real-time to prevent injury
during surgery by providing warning signs of an adverse event. 52 As
such, the medical malpractice considerations with monitoring
technologies differ from those of diagnostic technologies.
Fortunately, courts have examined the emergence of two monitoring
technologies: electronic fetal monitorings (EFM) and carbon dioxide
monitorings.
EFM, also known as fetal heart monitoring, is used during labor to
prevent brain injury in infants by measuring the fetal heart rate and
the variability of the heart rate to identify neurological function. 153
Although the effectiveness of EFM is frequently challenged, ' 54 courts
routinely accept this evidence in medical malpractice actions. ' 5  A
149. Nance v. Hitch, 76 S.E.2d 461, 468 (N.C. 1953).
150. PETER D. JACOBSON, PEW CHARITABLE TR., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND THE CULTURE OF
TECHNOLOGY 16 (2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ww
wpewtrustsorg/news/press-releases/medicalliability/medma1092204pdf.pdf.
151. Pinto et al., supra note 146, at 377.
152. MOLLER, supra note 4, at 1.
153. Wareing ex rel. Wareing v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
Electronic fetal monitors, also known as fetal heart monitoring is used to measure:
the fetal heart rate, and in particular, the variability in the fetal
heart rate, that is, small regular changes in the lapse of time from
beat-to-beat. Good beat-to-beat variability suggests normal
neurological function. The deeper the heart rate drops and the
longer the deceleration lasts, the greater the risk of possible
neurological injury to the fetus.
Id.
154. See, e.g., Karin B. Nelson et al., Uncertain Value of Electronic Fetal Monitoring in
Predicting Cerebral Palsy, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 614 (1996), http://www.nejm.org/d
oi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM199603073341001; Thomas P. Sartwelle, Electronic Fetal
Monitoring: A Bridge Too Far, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 313-14 (2012).
155. See, e.g., Wareing, 943 F. Supp. at 1508; Johnson v. Morehouse Gen. Hosp., 63 So.
3d 87, 110-13 (La. 2011); Marcano Rivera v. Turabo Med. Ctr. P'ship, 415 F.3d 162,
168-70 (1st Cir. 2005); Alefv. Alta Bates Hosp., 5 Cal. App. 4th 208, 215 (1992).
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study has shown that the advent of EFM has increased payments in
malpractice cases. 15 6
EFM was introduced into clinical use in 1968, and within ten years
was used in about half of all deliveries in California.1 7 Currently,
EFM is used in approximately 85% of annual births and is the most
common obstetrical procedure in the United States during labor.'58
The rise of the technology can be attributed to a 1975 study in which
two experts predicted that EFM would reduce intrapartum deaths,
mental retardation, and cerebral palsy by half.15 9 The timing of this
technology's emergence was critical; EFM arrived during a time
when the "nation was poised to accept new technologies" and when
there was great concern over infant health. 160
Despite studies questioning EFM's validity, EFM remains both a
medical and legal standard of care, and multimillion dollar judgments
are common. 161  As with IOM, the plaintiffs' primary theory of
negligence associated with EFM is the failure to properly read and
monitor results.'62 For instance, the First Circuit sustained a jury
judgment of $5.5 million, when fetal heart monitoring was
improperly used to evaluate the condition of a fetus, which was at
high risk for complications during delivery. 163 The national standard
of care required the hospital to monitor the fetal heart rate every
fifteen minutes; however, the nurse only checked the monitoring
display at most every thirty minutes. 164 Failure to monitor the labor
in accordance with the national standard of care was sufficient to
hold the hospital liable for the plaintiffs' damages. 65
The failure of a nurse to alert a physician to abnormalities on the
fetal heart monitoring strips could also support a finding of
negligence. 166  In Johnson v. Morehouse General Hospital, the
hospital breached the applicable standard of care, which required
nurses to immediately report any abnormalities which could indicate
156. JACOBSON, supra note 150, at 32-33.
157. Sartwelle, supra note 154, at 319.
158. Id. at 313.
159. Id. at 320.
160. Margaret Lent, The Medical and Legal Risks of the Electronic Fetal Monitor, 51
STAN. L. REV. 807, 812 (1999).
161. See Marcano Rivera v. Turabo Med. Ctr. P'ship, 415 F.3d 162, 168-70 (1st Cir.
2005); see also Sartwelle, supra note 154, at 323.
162. JACOBSON, supra note 150, at 31-34.
163. See Marcano Rivera, 415 F.3d at 168-70.
164. Id. at 167-68.
165. Id.
166. Johnson v. Morehouse Gen. Hosp., 63 So. 3d 87,103 (La. 2011).
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problems or issues with the mother or child. 167  According to the
plaintiff, had the physician been notified of the abnormalities, the
physician would have immediately ordered a Caesarean section, and
the baby could possibly have been delivered in a healthy state;
therefore, the hospital was liable. 168
However, the physician's failure to perform a Caesarean section
after an EFM strip indicates the presence of abnormalities will not
always establish negligence. 169 In 2014, the Tenth Circuit decided a
medical malpractice lawsuit involving EFM in which the plaintiffs
child was born with cerebral palsy. 170 At trial, both parties' experts
expressed differing opinions on whether a Caesarean section should
have been performed after the EFM strip indicated potential brain
injury.'7 ' The defense expert challenged the reliability of EFM by
opining that "electronic fetal monitoring has a [sic] extremely high
false positive rate, an extremely low positive predictive value for
certainly predicting cerebral palsy .... ,,1172 Because this position was
consistent with the positions of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists-specifically that EFM had
questionable predictive value when it came to cerebral palsy-the
court of appeals concluded that the district court correctly defined the
controlling standard of care. 173 Thus, Gallardo indicates that, even
when a medical technology is well-accepted as a standard of care,
arguments challenging the usefulness of the technology can be
successful, as long as support is found within the medical
community. 174
Another medical monitoring technology that is utilized in the
operating room is carbon dioxide monitoring. Carbon dioxide
monitors measure exhaled carbon dioxide during surgery, allowing
for early detection of insufficient oxygen to prevent brain injury,
something that could only be detected in the past by noticing
167. Id.
168. Id. at 113.
169. See Gallardo v. United States, 752 F.3d 865, 876-80 (10th Cir. 2014).
170. Id. at 867.
171. Id. at 871-73.
172. Id. at 873.
173. Id. at 876.
174. See id. ("The district court, however, chose not to accept Dr. Ross's testimony as
defining the controlling standard of care because it was inconsistent not only with the
opinions expressed by Drs. McCutcheon and Gore, but more importantly because it
was inconsistent with the positions taken by ACOG in its publications and guidelines.
In other words, the district court effectively determined that ACOG's positions,
particularly its position that EFM strips have questionable predictive value when it
comes to cerebral palsy, were adequate or objectively reasonable.").
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darkening blood.175 In the 1990s, carbon dioxide monitors came into
widespread use, and they are currently included in the American
Society of Anesthesiology's monitoring standards. 176 Unlike EFM,
which has increased medical malpractice claims, and spawned what
one attorney has deemed an "international malpractice crisis,"'1 77
carbon dioxide monitors have decreased catastrophic cases, thereby
decreasing claims against anesthesiologists. 78
Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, one of the few
reported opinions discussing carbon dioxide monitors, illustrates how
a court recognized carbon dioxide monitoring as a legal standard of
care during a time when the technology was just beginning to be
utilized by hospitals and was not required by professional
standards. 179 The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was negligent in
not providing the anesthesiologist with end-tidal carbon dioxide
monitors for an elective abortion and tubal ligation procedure. 80 The
hospital contended that the plaintiff failed to provide testimony
regarding the number of hospitals using carbon dioxide monitors at
the time, and that the plaintiffs evidence only characterized usage of
the monitors as recommended or encouraged practice, and an
emerging or developing standard, which was insufficient to establish
a standard of care.'8' The court noted that the plaintiff's testimony
was sufficient to establish a standard of care because the standard of
care requires considering what a reasonably prudent hospital would
do, which could exceed care beyond the minimum required by law or
professional regulations.182  Most probative for the court was
evidence that the chairman of the hospital's anesthesiology
department submitted a request for the hospital to obtain the
175. See Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 1990); Ann S.
Lofsky, Anesthesiology, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A PHYsICIAN's SOURCEBOOK 115,
116 (Richard E. Anderson ed., 2005).
176. Lofsky, supra note 175, at 116.
177. Sartwelle, supra note 154, at 314.
178. Lofsky, supra note 175, at 115-16.
179. Washington, 579 A.2d at 180.
180. Id. at 180-82. In support of its claim, the plaintiff's expert cited to two publications.
The first was the American Association of Anesthesiology (AAA) Standards for Basic
Intra-Operative Monitoring, which "encouraged" the use of the monitors. The second
was a Harvard Medical School study which indicated that the technology was in use at
Harvard, and that "monitoring end-tidal carbon dioxide is an emerging standard and is
strongly preferred." Id. at 182.
181. Id. at 182.
182. Id.
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monitoring, stating that, without the monitors, the hospital would
"fail to meet the national standard of care." '183
EFM and carbon dioxide monitoring, like IOM, are monitoring
technologies used during surgery to prevent an injury from occurring
by alerting a physician of the possibility of an adverse event. 184 Both
technologies are useful tools to assist the lawyer and fact-finder in
determining exactly what occurred in an operating room, ascertaining
precisely when the event occurred, and shedding light on who, if
anyone, was responsible for the injury. However, the technologies'
effects on the medical malpractice landscape is entirely different.
EFM has spurred birth injury litigation and resulted in huge
judgments for plaintiffs.'85  On the other hand, carbon dioxide
monitors have reduced claims against anesthesiologists, resulting in
anesthesia becoming one of the few medical specialties to see
declining insurance premiums.186 Nonetheless, in cases of EFM and
carbon dioxide monitoring, courts have promulgated certain
important legal principles which could help predict how courts in the
future will react when carving out IOM specific case law.
The first issue with 1OM use is whether failure to monitor
constitutes a violation of the standard of care. In early X-ray cases, a
similar question was decided. For example, in Lippold v. Kidd, one
of the first cases establishing that failure to X-ray could form a prima
facie case of negligence, the court accepted expert testimony that the
ordinary practice of physicians at that time was to use an X-ray
machine.187 Similarly, one study shows that IOM is the ordinary
practice of physicians with anterior and posterior
thoracic/thoracolumbar cases, 88 and the American Academy of
Neurology has considered IOM "standard practice" for almost 30
years. 189
In Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, the court, in
determining whether carbon dioxide monitors should be a standard of
care, looked to guidelines that only encouraged, but did not require,
the use of carbon dioxide monitors. 19° The court determined that,
because other hospitals at the time used carbon dioxide monitors, and
183. Id. at 183.
184. Id. at 180; Wareing ex rel. Wareing v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D.
Fla. 1996).
185. Sartwelle, supra note 154, at 314.
186. Lofsky, supra note 175, at 115.
187. Lippold v. Kidd, 269 P. 210, 213 (Or. 1928).
188. See Magit et al., supra note 32, at 282.
189. See Am. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, supra note 68, at 1.
190. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 182 (D.C. 1990).
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because their use was recommended, the plaintiff established the
applicable standard of care.'91
Similar guidelines are present with IOM. No standards of care
exist regarding IOM use, and professional organizations are careful
not to identify their guidelines as the standard of care. 192  For
example, professional organizations such as the American Clinical
Neurophysiology Society (ACNS) specify, in their "recommended"
standards:
Neurophysiologic intraoperative monitoring (NIOM)
provides information about the functional integrity of neural
structures in anesthetized patients. The goal of NIOM is to
make surgery safer by detecting incipient neurological
injury at a time when it can be avoided or minimized and by
aiding in the identification of neural structures. The
following guidelines emphasize important aspects of NIOM
while avoiding the temptation to promulgate rigid rules into
a field in constant development. These guidelines should
not be viewed as a "how-to manual" for NIOM, but rather
as a summary of the general principles. 93
Likewise, other IOM practice guidelines explicitly state that they are
not a "medicolegal document" and provide, "[t]hese Guidelines are
an attempt to define minimum IONM-P practices under typical
circumstances. Because each case has unique circumstances, the
failure to completely meet some aspects of these Guidelines cannot
be construed to imply negligence or breach of duty."' 94 Even though
the ACNS has not proclaimed that their guidelines are required or a
standard of care, courts may still use these guidelines to establish a
standard of care. 195
When evaluating an emerging technology, clinical guidelines play
a significant role in determining whether the failure to use a
technology will constitute a deviation from the standard of care. 9 6
However, the admissibility and usefulness of clinical practice
guidelines will depend on whether the guidelines are evidence-based
191. Id.
192. Tomei et al., supra note 72, at 19.
193. ACNS GUIDELINE 11 A, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
194. Skinner et al., supra note 15, at 105 (emphasis added).
195. See Washington, 579 A.2d at 182-83.
196. See Gallardo v. United States, 752 F.3d 865, 875-80 (10th Cir. 2014); Washington,
579 A.2d at 180.
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or not.197 Guidelines may be written to improve healthcare practices,
but they may also be written by liability and health insurers with the
goal of reducing the cost of healthcare and associated litigation. 98
Thus, guidelines often do not represent the prevailing theory of
care. 199 Nor can guidelines be dispositive on the issue of negligence
when there is not a single authoritative and controlling set of
guidelines. 00 This concern is emphasized with the use of IOM when
both the American Society of Neurophysiological Monitoring
(ASNM) and the ACNS stress that their guidelines are not
requirements. 20 ' As previously mentioned, the ACNS clearly states
that its guidelines function not as manuals for the performance of
IOM, "but rather as a summary of the general principles[,] '20 2 and the
ASNM refers to its guidelines as "position statements," with the goal
of providing updated documents to healthcare providers to assist their
choices for patient care.203
On the other hand, guidelines that evolve from evidence-based
medicine and have the goal of improving patient treatment have
enhanced trustworthiness.2°4 The ASNM declared that its guidelines
are evidence-based, 205 and the ACNS stated that its goal is to "make
surgery safer by detecting incipient neurological injury at a time
when it can be avoided or minimized and by aiding in the
197. See Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines: Should They Constitute
Conclusive Evidence of the Standard of Care?, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 112 (2000),
for a discussion of clinical practice guidelines and their evidentiary weight and role in
defining a legal standard of care.
198. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 651-52 (2001).
199. Id. at 673.
200. Id. at 656.
201. See AM. SOC'Y OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING, supra note 14; ACNS
GUIDELINE 11 A, supra note 11.
202. See ACNS GUIDELINE 1 A, supra note 11.
203. See Position Statements, AM. SOC'Y OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING,
http://www.asnm.org/?page=PositionStatements (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
204. Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Healthcare Reform: An
Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21, 21 (2012).
205. See AM. SOC'Y OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING, supra note 203; J. Richard
Toleikis, AM. SocY OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING, INTRAOPERATIVE
MONITORING USING SOMATOSENSORY EVOKED POTENTIALS 46 (2010),
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.asnm.org/resource/resmgr/position-statements/sep.pd
f; Ronald E. Leppanen, Intraoperative Monitoring of Segmental Spinal Nerve Root
Function With Free-Run and Electrically-Triggered Electromyography and Spinal
Cord Function With Reflexes and F-Responses, 19 J. CLINICAL MONITORING &
COMPUTING 437, 455 (2005), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.asnm.org/resource/resmg
r/PositionStatements/EMG-published.pdf.
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identification of neural structures. 2 °6  Thus, while the IOM
guidelines may not be dispositive on the issue of whether a surgeon
deviated from the standard of care, it seems that, as in Washington v.
Washington Hospital Center, current IOM guidelines will be
admissible to support an expert's opinion regarding the general
standard of care.2°7 Conversely, guidelines could be introduced, as in
Gallardo v. United States, to question the value of utilizing IOM in a
particular procedure; at least one clinical guideline has determined
that spinal IOM has "predictive but not preventive value."208
Additionally, in cases involving the misuse of EFM, courts have
been required to determine who, if anyone, is liable for the patient's
injury resulting from the misuse of the technology. 209 In Wareing ex
rel. Wareing v. United States, for instance, the court concluded that
the failure to adequately monitor the progress of labor by "fail[ing] to
chart several notable decelerations of the heart rate on the fetal heart
monitor strips" constituted a breach of the standard of care. 210 The
court accepted the plaintiffs expert's testimony that the information
on the fetal monitoring strips had been ignored and increased the risk
of brain damage.21 1 According to the expert, the hospital should have
taken immediate, appropriate action at the time of the signs of fetal
distress to prevent brain damage.212  Likewise, in Thomas v.
University Hospital of Cleveland, the plaintiff argued that, at the time
the IOM signals decreased, the proper standard of care would have
been to take corrective action (perform a wake-up test) and the
surgeon's failure to do so decreased Thomas's chance of recovery.213
Other arguments regarding negligent use present in both the EFM
and IOM context is the failure to give notice of abnormalities in
signals. In Johnson v. Morehouse General Hospital, the nurse failed
to notify the physician of abnormalities noted on the strips, and had
these changes been reported, the doctor would have ordered a
Caesarean section, possibly resulting in the healthy delivery of the
206. See ACNS GUIDELINE 1 A, supra note 11.
207. See Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 180-82 (D.C. 1990); Mello,
supra note 198, at 656.
208. Tomei et al., supra note 72, at 16.
209. See Wareing ex reL. Wareing v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 1504, 1536 (S.D. Fla.
1996); Johnson v. Morehouse Gen. Hosp., 63 So. 3d 87, 110-13 (La. 2011).
210. Wareing, 943 F. Supp. at 1536.
211. Id. at 1508.
212. Id. at 1536.
213. Thomas v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, No. 90550, 2008 WL 5191340, at *1-4 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2008).
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baby. 14  Analogously, the largest medical malpractice award
involving 1OM was based on the theory that the IOM technicians
were negligent by failing to notify the surgeon of a significant loss of
signals during surgery, thereby precluding the physician from taking
measures to prevent paralysis. 5
B. Defining Negligence Standards with IOM
Although courts have not implemented specific standards for
determining reasonableness with regards to the adaptation of medical
technologies, there are five primary considerations that courts assess
when defining reasonableness. These factors, which comport with
the basic principles of tort law, are: (1) the risk of injury to the patient
from the use of the technology,216 (2) the cost of the technology to the
healthcare system,217 (3) the extent of the benefit to the patient, 2 8 (4)
the availability and pervasiveness of use of the technology, 29 and (5)
the reliability of the technology.220 These considerations effectively
214. Johnson, 63 So. 3datI 10-13.
215. McKnight v. Catholic Hosp., S-1500-CV-269628-SPC, 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
13867 (Cal. Super. Dec. 02, 2013).
216. See Riser v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 620 So. 2d 372, 377 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(concluding that a physician who had performed a femoral arteriogram using a new
imaging technology was liable because "it is a breach of the standard of care .. , to
subject a patient to a particular test or procedure which has any risk of injury .. if
that doctor knows or reasonably should know that the procedure will be of no benefit
to the patient"). Additionally, the much discussed case of Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d
981 (Wash. 1974), where the court determined that the failure to administer a
glaucoma test to a 32-year-old patient despite the medical standards that did not
require administration of a glaucoma test to patients under 40 constituted negligence.
In coming to its decision, the Helling court noted that "[t]he giving of the test is
harmless if the physical condition of the eye permits." Id. at 5983 (emphasis added).
217. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932) (determining that because
the importance of having radio equipment at the time outweighed its small cost, the
tugboat operator was negligent).
218. See Johnson v. Morehouse Gen. Hosp., 63 So. 3d 87, 110-13 (La. 2011) (noting that
had the technology been properly used, the doctor would have been notified of
abnormalities and ordered a Caersaran section which could have resulted in a healthy
delivery of the baby).
219. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 1990) (noting that
other similarly situated hospitals at the time utilized carbon dioxide monitoring); see
also Das v. Thani, 795 A.2d 876, 879, 884 (N.J. 2002) (observing that electronic fetal
monitoring was widely used for a significant amount of time prior to plaintiffis
surgery and that the modem equipment was available in the physician's office "that
would have enabled him to comply with the standard of care").
220. Gallardo v. United States, 752 F.3d 865, 875-80 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding persuasive
defendant's expert testimony that the medical technology had an "extremely high
false positive rate, [and] an extremely low positive predictive value").
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fulfill the interest of compensating patients for the negligence of
healthcare providers, without imposing undue burdens on healthcare
providers that could inhibit medical progress and innovation.
Clinical guidelines, which are instrumental in supporting a party's
arguments and expert testimony, will also be useful in proving these
elements. 2 ' These considerations are neither exhaustive nor
required, and are merely a suggested approach for analyzing cases
involving the misuse or nonuse of a medical technology. Examining
IOM through this multifactorial approach clarifies the ambiguity and
unpredictability associated with determining whether a healthcare
defendant acted reasonably in a particular clinical situation.
1. Risk of Injury to the Patient from the Use of Intraoperative
Neuromonitoring
Risks from IOM include infection at the electrode site, which can
be avoided by the use of universal precautions.222 Electrical safety of
the patient is an issue that includes concern for the proper placement
of needle electrodes.223 Although bums are extremely rare, the use of
an electrocautery grounding pad on the patient further prevents the
risk of electrical bums.224 Stimulation of the motor cortex may cause
a patient to bite his or her tongue, which can be prevented by the
placement of a soft bite block.225 The risks for these injuries are
extremely low, with one IOM company listing the potential risks for
infections, bums, hematomas, and neurological losses at less than
0.1%, and the risk for tongue lacerations and seizures at less than
1.0%.226 Thus, the risk of injury to a patient from IOM is remarkably
low.
2. Cost of Intraoperative Neuromonitoring to the Healthcare System
As discussed earlier, the cost-benefit analysis of IOM is far from
settled. 27 In 2007, a spinal fusion cost, on average $24,600, making
221. See supra notes 191-213 and accompanying text discussing the use of clinical
guidelines.
222. Kale & Swisher, supra note 80, at 16.
223. See MOLLER, supra note 4, at 20.
224. Kale & Swisher, supra note 80, at 16.
225. Stecker, supra note 74, at S 176.
226. Consent for Intraoperative Neurophysiological Monitoring, ADVANCED MONITORING
SERV., http://www.ams-ionm.com/wp-content/uploads/ConsentForm.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2016).
227. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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it the fourth most costly operation in the United States.22  The
average cost for IOM was calculated as approximately $1,500.229
However, in a comparison of lifetime costs due to neurological
injuries, the lifetime costs for patients whose procedures included
1OM was approximately $23,000 less than those patients whose
procedures did not include 1OM.230  Thus, the lifetime cost savings
for over 100 surgeries would exceed $2.3 million.23'
Contrarily, another study investigated the cost of 1OM performed
during one to two-level minimally invasive spinal surgeries and
concluded that 1OM added no benefit and increased the cost of the
surgeries by an average of $4,000.232 Another study supported the
theory that 1OM is not needed in low risk surgeries because IOM
increased the cost of surgeries by $1,200.233 However, it should be
noted that the researchers cautioned against extrapolating the results
to complex cases.234 Furthermore, many studies agree that TOM is
effective, cost efficient, and necessary for complex surgeries. 235 The
cost-effectiveness of IOM is highly dependent on the risk and
complexity of the surgery and the rate of prevention.236 For instance,
the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio,
Texas, used a cost-benefit analysis to establish a departmental policy
limiting TOM to procedures for either deformity correction or
intradural lesions.237
3. Extent of the Benefit to the Patient
1OM is a valuable technique to identify neural structures including
the peripheral nerves, spinal cord, brainstem, and cortex, during
surgery, as well as to assess the function of these structures during
228. Ney et al., supra note 74, at 280.
229. Id. at 281-82.
230. Id. at 282.
231. Id. at 283.
232. Garces et al., supra note 74, at 58.
233. Helwick, supra note 74.
234. Id.
235. See Whitney Sheen James et al., A Socioeconomic Analysis of Intraoperative
Neurophysiological Monitoring During Spine Surgery: National Use, Regional
Variation, and Patient Outcomes, 37 NEUROSURGICAL Focus 1, 4 (2014); Stecker,
supra note 74, at S183.
236. See Ney et al., supra at 74, at 283.
237. Shane A. Hawksworth et al., Conservative Policy for Intraoperative Neuromonitoring
in Spinal Surgery, 62 CLINICAL NEUROSURGERY 190, 190 (2015), http://joumals.lww.
com/neurosurgery/Fulltext/2015/08001/Conservative..Policy.forjIntraoperative.36.as
px#.
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surgery.238 Identification of the facial nerve during acoustic tumor
removals allows the surgeon to preserve the facial nerve function
substantially better than in patients whose surgeons did not use
IOM.239  The Scoliosis Research Society reviewed studies and
concluded that IOM in spinal surgeries assists in the early detection
of neurological complications and may prevent post-operative
injuries. 240  The Society prefers IOM as the method for the early
detection of spinal cord deficit during surgical manipulation of the
spine.24' Additionally, the American Academy of Neurology and
American Clinical Neurophysiology Society concluded that IOM is
effective in predicting an increased risk for postoperative
neurological deficits from spinal surgery.142  In a study reviewing
over 12,300 surgeries, researchers found that the use of IOM during
spinal surgeries reduced the risk of postoperative injuries from 3.1%
to 0.13%, and intervention by the surgeons improved the IOM data in
88.7% of the cases. 43
4. Availability and Pervasiveness of Use of Intraoperative
Neuromonitoring
IOM is commonly available and widely utilized. A survey of 173
spinal surgeons in the United States revealed that 86% of the
surgeons used IOM in more than 51,000 cases.244 A study of
neurologists who interpret IOM data indicates that the use of IOM
has increased from approximately 10,000 cases to approximately
140,000 cases in thirteen years.245 Another study stated that 12% of
spinal cases utilize 10M, and, unsurprisingly, use of IOM is more
common in urban areas compared to rural areas. 46 Regionally, the
Northeast reported the lowest rate of use with 8% of cases being
238. Stecker, supra note 74, at S 174.
239. ELIZABETH A.M. FROST, CLINICAL ANESTHESIA IN NEUROSURGERY 117 (2d ed. 1991).
240. Neuromonitoring Information Statement, SCOLIOSIS RES. Soc'Y, (Jan. 2009),
http://www. srs.org/about-srs/quality-and-safety/position-statements/neuromonitoring-
information-statement.
241. Id.
242. See Ney et al., supra note 74, at 280.
243. Barry L. Raynor et al., Significant Changes or Loss of Intraoperative Loss of Data, 38
SPINE 101, 108 (2013).
244. John P. Ney, Changes to CMS Reimbursement Rules for Intraoperative
Neurophysiological Monitoring: Implications for Telemedicine, 19 TELEMEDICINE J.
E-HEALTH 791, 791 (2013).
245. Marc R. Nuwer et al., Practice Patterns for Intraoperative Neurophysiologic
Monitoring, 81 NEUROLOGY 1, 3-4 (2013).
246. James et al., supra note 235, at 2.
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monitored while the West reported the highest rate with 21% of the
cases monitored.247
5. Reliability of IOM technology
Reliability of IOM is probably the most controversial aspect of
IOM in medical malpractice actions because IOM results can
fluctuate during surgery. Anesthetics cause a dose-related change by
reducing the amplitude and increasing the latency of SSEPs 48 In
addition, nitrous oxide and halogenated inhalational agents
substantially reduce results for transcranial electrical motor evoked
potentials (TceMEPs), and neuromuscular blocking agents can
eliminate TceMEPs and EMG results.249  Thus, when there is a
change in the IOM results, the anesthesia record must also be
reviewed to determine whether the results were the result of a
surgical injury or a change in anesthesia.
Other systemic factors that may be detrimental to IOM results
include the patient's body temperature and the patient's blood
pressure.2 0  Additionally, the patient's pre-existing neurological
conditions, such as diabetes, may make acquiring reliable data
difficult.25 1 Equipment malfunctions, such as wet or dislodged
electrodes, can also alter results. 2 2
All of these elements may contribute to false positive and false
negative IOM results. A false positive result occurs when there are
changes in IOM but no cause can be determined and no postoperative
injury arises. 3 A false negative results occurs when there are no
changes in IOM monitoring but the patient develops a postoperative
neurological injury that IOM should have detected. 54 In a study of
247. Id.
248. J. Richard Toleikis, Intraoperative Monitoring Using Somatosensory Evoked
Potentials, 19 J. CLINICAL MONITORING & COMPUTING 241, 248 (2005).
249. ACNS GUIDELINE 1 A, supra note 11.
250. Toleikis, supra note 248, at 251-52.
251. Andres A. Gonzalez & Parastou Shilian, Somatosensory Evoked Potentials, in A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC INTRAOPERATIVE MONITORING 22 (Aatif
M. Husain ed., 2d ed. 2015).
252. Id. at 24.
253. H. Wiedemayer et al., False Negative Findings in Intraoperative SEP Monitoring:
Analysis of 658 Consecutive Neurosurgical Cases and Review of Published Reports,
75 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 280, 282-83 (2004),
http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/75/2/280.full.pdf+html?sid=3a1 b556d-7813-4b56-86ee-
6ef77af3aeff.
254. Id.
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106 IOM changes, 3.9% of the changes were false positives and 4.1%
were false negatives.255
Despite these drawbacks, IOM is widely regarded as reliable.
Courts have accepted clinical evoked potentials such as nerve
conduction studies to determine the degree of disability in Social
Security benefit cases. 56 Additionally, organizations such as the
American Academy of Neurology support IOM as established and
reliable technology.257
CONCLUSION
Despite the use of IOM in the operating room for over fifty years,
the technology has maintained a low profile in the courtroom. Only
in the past decade have attorneys began to advance arguments
regarding its use, and courts have yet to establish any IOM specific
case law.258 IOM can be used to support the direct liability of a
surgeon, an anesthesiologist, a technologist, or a technologist's
employer.25 9 Conversely, its use could also be exculpatory.2 60 Due to
the dramatic increase in IOM use in the operating room, familiarity
with IOM is critical for both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys.161
New medical technologies can dramatically impact medical
malpractice litigation by presenting new risks of misuse, providing
practitioners with a greater ability to precisely identify how an injury
occurred, and exposing medical mistakes that were previously
difficult to prove. As one scholar noted "[n]egligence law is
fundamentally a creature of technology; really, it is the common
law's response to technology. ' 262 However, as demonstrated by the
differing outcomes on the medical malpractice system of two
monitoring technologies, electronic fetal monitoring and carbon
dioxide monitoring, medical technologies' impact can be unclear.
Based on the limited case law involving IOM, and the courts'
treatment of comparable technologies in the past, it is likely that IOM
will be considered a standard of care. Although there are no specific
standards for determining whether the misuse or nonuse of
255. Id. at 283.
256. See cases cited supra note 66.
257. See AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, supra note 68.
258. See supra Part II.
259. See supra Part IIA-B.
260. See supra Part II.C.
261. See Nuwer et al., supra note 245, at 3-4; James et al., supra note 235, at 1.
262. Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions,
and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293, 293 (1988).
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technology constitutes a deviation from the standard of care, courts
have considered the risk of harm to the patient from use, the costs
versus the benefits of use, reliability of the technology at issue, and
whether the technology is widely available.2 63 A thorough analysis of
these considerations when evaluating expert testimony could result in
less uncertainty in defining the reasonable person standard when new
medical technologies are involved. Applying these factors to 10M
shows that, in complex surgeries, a healthcare defendant will likely
be found liable due to the failure to use 10M or negligent
performance of IOM.264 Negligent performance of 10M generally
occurs as a result of the failure to heed 10M results, the failure to
notify of changes in signals, negligent oversight, and the utilization of
incorrect equipment.265  As surgery decreases in complexity,
however, so does the potential for liability. Who will be liable will
depend on the interplay between the parties involved, and their roles
in the operating room.2 66
263. See supra Part III.B.
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. See supra Part II.B.
266. See supra Part I.B.
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APPENDIX I
TYPES OF NEUROMONITORING MODALITIES
1. Free Run and Stimulated Electromyography (EMG)
instantaneously monitors the mechanical irritation of a nerve or nerve
root in its corresponding muscle.267 Triggered or stimulated EMG is
intentional stimulation. 68 In a spinal instrumentation procedure, a
surgeon will stimulate pedicle screws.269 If the screw is too close to a
nerve, that stimulation will spread to a nerve and appear on the
EMG.27° In tumor resection craniotomies, a surgeon will stimulate
tissue to identify neural structures or to assess the nerve's
functionality.271
2. Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SSEP) assess the
function of peripheral sensory nerves, like the ulnar nerves in the
wrists or the posterior tibial nerves in the ankles.272 After the nerves
of the hands or feet are stimulated with an electrical pulse, SSEP
records the responses through known pathways and neural
structures. 273 Thus, a surgeon could tell whether a loss or reduction
of a response occurs before the impulse reaches the spine or after it
enters the brain in spinal surgeries.274 In cranial surgeries, like
aneurysm repairs, and vascular surgeries such as carotid
endarterectomy, SSEP can indicate whether a loss of signal is due to
loss of blood flow or due to an external factor.275
267. Robert E. Minahan & Allen S. Mandir, Basic Neurophysiologic Intraoperative
Monitoring Techniques, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC
INTRAOPERATIVE MONITORING 21 (AatifM. Husain ed., 1st ed. 2008).
268. Id. at 28.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 29-30; Matthew Eager et al., Intraoperative Neurophysiological Monitoring
(IONM): Lessons Learned from 32 Case Events in 2069 Spine Cases, 51 AM. J.
ELECTRONEURODIAGNOSTIC TECH. 247, 250-51 (2011).
273. Minahan & Mandir, supra note 267, at 30.
274. Id.
275. Toleikis, supra note 205, at 6.
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3. Transcranial Electrical Motor Evoked Potentials
(TceMEPs) assess injury to motor nerve pathways through the
anterior spinal cord.276 TceMEPs are like stimulated EMG in that
both tests elicit responses in muscles, but TceMEPs stimulate the
entire motor cortex while stimulated EMG stimulates a specific
nerve. 277  SSEPs monitors the posterior spinal column while
TceMEPs monitors the anterior spinal column.278 Thus, the two
modalities are often run together to provide complete coverage of the
spinal cord.279  TceMEPs are used to test spinal cord function in
spinal surgeries, aortic aneurysm repairs, and brain aneurysm
surgeries.280
4. Electroencephalography (EEG) measures cortical activity in
frequencies to detect widespread, gross changes in cortical
function. 281 Technically, it is not an evoked potential because nothing
is stimulated; it merely records electrical brain activity. If cranial
ischemia occurs, lower EEG frequencies may occur, while higher
frequencies may be reduced or lost.282 Sometimes, surgeons induce
reduced or no activity to protect the brain during times of cerebral
hypoperfusion.2 83 Electroencephalography is used in surgeries during
which the cortex or vascular supply to the cortex is at risk such as in
epilepsy surgeries, carotid endarterectomies, cranial aneurysms, or
arteriovenous malformations.284
5. Brainstem Auditory Evoked Response (BAER) monitors the
peripheral and brainstem pathway of the auditory nerve (the
vestibulocochlear nerve or VIII cranial nerve).285 Instead of an
electrical stimulation, audible clicks are delivered to the ears.286
BAERs can isolate the dysfunctional area because the waveforms
correspond with known neural structures along the hearing
276. Minahan & Mandir, supra note 267, at 33.
277. Id. at 28, 33.
278. Id. at 33-34.
279. See generally Eager et al., supra note 272, 247-63 (explaining that the combined use
provides all of tools needed to sufficiently monitor the entire spinal cord during both
routine and difficult surgeries).
280. Minahan & Mandir, supra note 267, at 37.
281. Id. at 38.
282. Id. at 40.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 42.
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pathway. 287 Thus, loss of the first waveform indicates a problem with
the auditory nerve, while loss of the fifth waveform indicates a
problem closer to the brainstem. 211 Because the brainstem is sensitive
to ischemia, BAERs comprise one method of indirectly monitoring
cranial perfusion. 289 This test is commonly used in cranial surgeries
for brainstem tumor, microvascular decompression, or vestibular
neurectomy. 290
6. Visible Evoked Potential (VEP) is not extensively used in the
operating room because of technical difficulties.2 91 It can be used
during operations in which the optic nerve or optic tract is at risk,
such as pituitary or cavernous sinus tumor resection and aneurysms
near the optic nerve.292 Stimulation consists of flash stimulation to
the patient's eyes, and the VEPs measure the response from the visual
cortex in the occipital lobe of the brain.293
Id. at 43.
Id.
MOLLER, supra note 4, at 118.
Minahan & Mandir, supra note 267, at 43.
MOLLER, supra note 4, at 82.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
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